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Abstract
In the twentieth century there was a signi￿cant trend towards larger local gov-
ernments through amalgamations in the western world. Amalgamations provide
potential economic bene￿ts but might also give rise to costs driven by opportunistic
political behavior. This study uses a compulsory amalgamation reform of munici-
palities in Sweden to test for such behavior. The reform gives a local government
incentives to accumulate debt before the amalgamation takes place, since the cost
will be shared by all tax payers in the new municipality. The strength of this in-
centive to free ride will be determined by the locality￿ s population size, relative to
the future size of the new locality. We ￿nd an economically large and statistically
signi￿cant free riding e⁄ect and the result is robust.
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In the twentieth century there was a trend in the western world towards larger local
governments through amalgamations.1 In Sweden, municipalities have been subject to
amalgamation reforms twice in the last sixty years. Amalgamation reforms have, among
other countries, also been carried out in USA, Canada, Norway and Australia. Amalga-
mations of local governments are still regarded as attractive and recently Denmark 275
municipalities amalgamated into less than 100 as of January 1, 2007. The arguments
advanced by the proponents of amalgamations are centered around economics of scale in
service production and the administration of government, economics of scope and other
more subtle "bigger is better"-arguments.2 Larger governments are supposed to be more
e¢ cient. Yet, previous studies of amalgamations provide little empirical evidence in favor
of increased e¢ ciency.3 In addition to what has previously been studied, amalgama-
tions may also have potential drawbacks before the amalgamation occurs. Speci￿cally,
a forward-looking politician may borrow and overspend before the amalgamation takes
place, since the pool of future taxes can be viewed as a common pool. Moreover, the
smaller a locality￿ s population size, relative to the size of the new locality, the stronger is
the incentive to free ride on the common pool of future taxes. Hence, the increase in per
capita debt due to amalgamations should be larger for relatively small than for relatively
large localities.4
The contribution of this paper is to empirically quantify the size of the free riding
behavior caused by amalgamations. To this end, I use a very large amalgamation reform
in Sweden which reduced the number of local governments from 848 to 278 over the period
1969-1974. There are a number of features, other than the very large number of amalga-
mations, which make this reform attractive from an econometric evaluation point of view.
First, the localities were forced to amalgamate by law and the law imposed variations
in the incentives to free ride. Thus, it is possible to implement a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
approach when evaluating the impact of the reform on the behavior of local governments.
Second, some localities did amalgamate before others, which can be used to provide ad-
ditional evidence on the free riding behavior, since the localities that amalgamate later
1See Sancton (2000) for a comprehensive study on the subject.
2See Dollery, Crase and Byrnes (2006) for a discussion.
3The evidence is clearly mixed and many studies point out that amalgamations in fact seem to increase
costs. See Bish (2001) for a comprehensive survey on this matter regarding USA and Canada. See Dollery
et al. (2006), Dollery and Crase (2004) and Byrnes and Dollery (2002) for results and references regarding
amalgamations in Australia. See Groes (2005) for studies in Denmark. For mixed results with regard to
Sweden see Nelson (1992) and Hanes (2003).
4In the political science literature, there exist comments on the fact that municipalities might "misbe-
have" before the amalgamation but, to my knowledge, this has not been further analyzed. Independently
of this paper, Jordahl and Liang (2006) have recently studied a previous amalgamation reform in Sweden.
However, the implementations and the nature of the reforms are very di⁄erent. See W￿ngmar (2003) for
an excellent analysis.
2have more time to exploit the common pool. Third, the reform was largely based on
measurable characteristics, which allows a test for whether the amalgamations were ￿as
good as randomly assigned". In other words, controlling for these characteristics should
have little e⁄ect on the estimated free riding e⁄ect if our empirical strategy is reasonable.
Fourth, Swedish local governments have a large degree of ￿scal freedom, which makes the
amalgamation reform a useful testing ground for the common pool problem.
I ￿nd strong support for amalgamations giving rise to a common pool problem. The
estimated e⁄ect is both statistically and economically signi￿cant. A locality with a very
strong incentive to free ride increases its per capita level of debt by approximately 26
% more than a locality with no incentives to free ride, everything else equal. Moreover,
the localities with more time to free ride increase their debt more, thereby holding the
incentive to free ride constant. The results are robust to a number of speci￿cation checks.
This paper is related to a number of di⁄erent literatures with a common pool feature,
i.e. where the costs are dispersed but the bene￿ts concentrated. Speci￿cally, it is related
to models relating council size or incidence of coalitions to government spending, which
have been widely used in the theory of political economy. However, the empirical evi-
dence is mixed and this paper provides a novel and very di⁄erent testing ground for the
common pool model.5 The study also relates to the vast literature with similar incentive
schemes, where politicians potentially do not internalize the whole cost of their spending
decision. The literature on weak budget constraints and budgetary rules provides similar
situations.6 Finally, empirical studies on corporate mergers typically conclude that these
seem unpro￿table.7 Clearly, the same types of incentives are at hand in the private sector
when companies engage in mergers.8
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section develops a basic common pool
model. The third section provides information and a background of the amalgamation
reform. In the fourth section, data and the empirical framework are discussed. The
main results are presented in section ￿ve. Section six extends the empirical analysis and
robustness checks are carried out. Section seven concludes the paper.
5The idea of common pool problems in politics goes back to Tullock (1959) and Buchanon and Tullock
(1962) and is formalized in Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). For more recent studies see, for exam-
ple, Baqir (2002), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Gilligan and Matsusuaka (2001), Perotti and Kontpoulos
(2002), Petterson-Lidbom (2003) and Persson and Tabellini (2003).
6Kornai (1979) provides a theory for soft budget constraints. See Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg
(2005) for recent empirical test. For a survey on the literature of budgetary institutions see Persson and
Tabellini (2002).
7Even though share prices seem to rise. See, for example, Fridolfsson and Stennek (September 2005).
8Investigating the free riding e⁄ect in the private sector is complicated, since mergers are not manda-
tory.
32 A Simple Model of the Common Pool Problem in
Amalgamations
This section develops a stylized common pool model in line with Persson and Tabellini
(1994). The purpose of the model is to motivate the empirical analysis, that is, derive
a relationship between a locality￿ s level of debt and the incentive to free ride due to a
common pool problem. Debt is introduced to fund spending in the ￿rst period in order
to generate a relation between debt and the strength of the incentive to free ride.9
Consider a setting consisting of municipalities i = 1;2;:::Q that will amalgamate in
the future. The population size of a municipality is Ni and
Q P
i=1
Ni = N. In period
one, the municipalities are independent. In period two, the municipalities are forced
to amalgamate, which is publicly known in period one. Individuals have quasi-linear














t is private consumption in period t = 1;2 and xi
2 is leisure in period two for an
agent i and V (￿) is well behaved.10 Individuals are identical, except for the geographic
parameter i. For simplicity, we assume that individuals￿only way of saving is through
lending to the municipality in the ￿rst period, where the debt is honored in the second
period. Let ￿ be the tax rate in period two. R is the gross interest rate and bi is the per
capita holding of municipal debt and ei is initial endowment. li is labor where li+xi = 1.
In period one, the consumer chooses the level of saving and in the second period, the
consumer chooses leisure and consumption. In the absence of discounting and given the
linearity of the utility function, we must have R = 1 for an interior solution bi 2 [0;ei]:






i + (1 ￿ ￿)l
i: (2)
Maximizing (1) w.r.t. xi
2; s.t. (2) yields the necessary conditions for a private equilibrium
and the optimal labor supply function:
l
i￿ = 1 ￿ x
i￿





(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ L
i(￿); 11
Now consider the public spending dimension of the problem. In the ￿rst period,
regions act independently. In the second period they amalgamate, so the debt of the
9I will assume universalism. The structure of the reform, where all municipalities do have the full
power of the spending decisions, gives at hand that this is a reasonable assumption. In fact, the strong
underlying assumptions of the decision procedure do correspond to the institutional setting in this case.





2) < 0: So higher tax rate distorts the labor-leisure choice.
4old independent municipalities is inherited by the new unit. The local government i can
only borrow to provide public goods in the ￿rst period and thus, the budget constraint
in period one is simply Nigi = Nibi () gi = bi: For period two, the budget constraint,













i = ￿L(￿): (3)
Since the tax rate determines the private equilibrium and by (3), we can describe the




N bi ￿ B; the private indirect utility
function becomes
u
￿ ￿ max[c1 + c2 + V (x2)] = e + (1 ￿ ￿)L
i(￿) + V (1 ￿ L
i(￿)) ￿ W(B):12 (4)
Preferences for public spending are assumed to be
w
i = W(B) + H(g
i) = W(B) + H(b
i); (5)
where H(:) is well behaved. Solving backwards, imposing repayment of the debt in period
two, we have the optimal condition as B = ￿L(￿) in period 2. In period one, incumbent





WB(B) < ￿WB(B); (6)
where Hg(bi) is the marginal utility of the good provided and ￿Ni
N WB(B) is the municipal
marginal cost of borrowing. Note that this is smaller than the marginal cost of borrowing
for the amalgam, ￿WB(B): Thus, spending on public goods in the ￿rst period and thus
borrowing are too high compared to the social optimal level of borrowing, which is the
classical common pool result and the smaller the relative size, the larger are the incentives
to borrow, everything else constant.
To summarize, the model implies that borrowing should be negatively related to Ni
N
where Ni is the current population size of locality i and N is the population size of the
future locality. Hence, the smaller is the current population size of a locality, relative to
the size of the new locality, the stronger is the incentive to free ride.
12Note u￿
￿ = ￿L(￿) + L￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + VLL￿(￿) < 0; and we must have WB(B) ￿ Wbi(B) < 0; and
Wbi(B) = WB(B)N
i
N < Wbj(B) = WB(B)N
i
N if Ni > Nj for i 6= j:
53 The Swedish Amalgamation Reform
This section discusses the background to the Swedish Amalgamation Reform that reduced
the number of municipalities from 848 to 278 during the period 1969 to 1974. Moreover,
some features of Swedish municipalities are presented.
In 1959, a committee of experts was appointed by the Swedish parliament to analyze
the e⁄ectiveness of local governments.13 In 1962, the committee concluded that most
municipalities were too small to provide e¢ cient services and suggested an amalgamation
reform as a solution. Moreover, the reform should be guided by the principle that the new
municipalities were to be constructed around economic/geographical centers, i.e., places
with a dense population. The new municipalities should have at least 8000 inhabitants in
the long run and they should also be more dispersed with respect to occupational char-
acter. The logic was that the agricultural sector￿ s part of the economy was decreasing
in favor of the manufacturing sector and particularly the services sector. The committee
considered both the tax base and the tax rate and argued that a harmonization between
municipalities was desirable. However, initial geographic factors could not be stretched
too far. A municipality from the southern part of Sweden could not, in practice, amal-
gamate with a municipality from the northern part, i.e., a municipality should not be
geographically divided. This meant that a large municipality that was located in be-
tween small municipalities might be subject to the amalgamation reform because of its
placement; consequently approximately 96 % of the municpalities were subject to the
reform. The proposal prescribed voluntary amalgamations, since it was assumed that the
municipalities would realize the gains of becoming larger. The parliament accepted the
committee report in 1962 in general, but added that splitting old municipalities should
be avoided. In the years following after 1962, the Swedish government constructed the
new units based on the mentioned principles, the so-called municipality blocks. How-
ever, the blocks had no legal meaning. They were theoretical constructs, but with the
creation of these, the government supposed that municipalities would merge into these
blocks on a voluntary basis. In 1965, Statistics Sweden began to publish statistics for
these theoretically constructed units (282 altogether).14 However, the vast majority of
the municipalities were reluctant to amalgamate.15 The Swedish government, led by the
Social Democratic Party, was not satis￿ed with the response of the municipalities and
decided to make the amalgamations mandatory but without changing the key elements of
the previous proposal.16 The law of 1969 forced the municipalities to amalgamate in line
13See SOU1961:9 (1961) and Bet.KU1962:1 (1962).
14The construction was ￿nished in 1964. 38 old municipalities were de￿ned as not being subject to the
amalagamation.
15Only 35 of the new municipalities had been completed in 1969. Nevertheless, more than 35 amalga-
mations took place in the period; 290 municipalities that existed in 1962 disappeared within the voluntary
period and 119 new muncipalities were created, but out of these 119 only 35 reached the complete status.
16See Prop.1969:103 (1969). However, the number of municipality blocks dropped by 7 to 275 and some
6with the constructed municipality blocks before the beginning of 1974. However, it was
up to the municipalities in the speci￿c block to decide whether to amalgamate at the end
of 1970 or at the end of 1973, henceforth denoted 1970/71 and 1973/74. In 1969, Sweden
consisted of 848 municipalities. In 1970/71, 525 amalgamated into 141 new units. So at
the beginning of 1971 there were 464 municpalites. At the end of 1973, 268 municipali-
ties amalgamated into 82 new units. At the beginning of 1974, Sweden consisted of 278
municipalities.
In addition to the extensive amalgamation reform, Swedish municipalities have at-
tractive features for studying the common pool problem. First, Swedish municipalities
have a constitutional right of self governance.17 They can decide on income taxation,
planning of local land, impose some local fees and freely take up short-term debt and the
municipal economy is a substantial part of the Swedish economy. In 1970, the munici-
pal share of GDP measured as consumption and investments was approximately 17 %,
a share that has remained rather stable ever since.18 Second, all Swedish municipalities
are governed by the same laws and institutions, which makes them favorable as units of
analysis. There were some restrictions on the use of long-term debt until 1979. A munic-
ipality could not take up long term debt for consumption and the loan should be aimed
at accumulating long-term assets. Moreover, the loan was to be used to acquire resources
regarded to be in the municipal political sphere, i.e. building schools or sports stadiums
but not military investments, for example. In general, the loan had to be approved by the
central government but as long as the mentioned principles were ful￿lled, the government
could not disapprove and there is no evidence of the central government ever denying an
application.19
To sum up, the amalgamation reform has its origins already in 1962 but the amalgama-
tion was voluntary until 1969. Approximately, only 4 % out of all municipalities in 1964
were regarded as not having to amalgamate but few municipalities chose to amalgamate.
In 1969, the Swedish government decided on mandatory amalgamation. The decision
was taken with a slim majority in the Swedish Parliament. A majority of the munici-
palities also protested but very small changes were made to the theoretically constructed
minor changes were made. Protests from municipalities were common but in general, the municipalities
did not have any succes when objecting to the law. See Nielsen (2003) for a summary or, speci￿cally,
Wallin (1973). However a few municipalities were succesful in their protests and did avoid amalgamation.
In comparison with the publications of 1965 Dals-Ed, Svedala, Sta⁄anstorp, Bara, Burl￿v, Mullsj￿, Orsa,
Sundbyberg, Solna, and H￿bo. Moreover, 6 municipalities that were regarded as large enough in 1965
actually amalgamated. Thus, 42 municipalities are stable over the whole period.
17This is true also in practice, which has been shown in several studies. See, for example, Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001) and Petterson-Lidbom (2003) for evidence on autonomy and more thorough descriptions
of the funtions of Swedish municipalities.
18This share also includes county councils("landsting") activities.
19The logic was that the utility of an investments would also be enjoyed by future tax payers. Some
exceptions to the general rule of state approval existed, for example for investments in water and sanitary
projects. See Gustafsson (1984) and Wallin, Andersson and AndrØn (1973).
7municipality blocks of 1964. After the amalgamation, Sweden had 278 municipalities in
1974.
4 Empirical Framework and Data
In this section, I ￿rst describe the empirical framework and motivate why a di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence approach is appropriate. Then, I describe the data used in the subsequent
analysis.
The basic common pool model in section 2 suggests that the level of per capita debt of
municipality i should be regressed on its population size before the amalgamation, relative
to the population size of the new municipality, Ni
N ; since it determines the municipal
marginal cost of borrowing. For expositional purposes, let us de￿ne the incentive to free
ride, Freeride = 1 ￿ Ni
N 2 [0:1):20 We could then write
Debti = ￿ + ￿Freeridei + ui; (7)
where u measures all other determinants (observed or unobserved) of debt. The parameter
of interest is ￿ - the free riding e⁄ect due to the common pool problem. The Swedish
amalgamation reform provides us with the required variation in Freeride. However,
there are to likely to exist unobserved di⁄erences across the municipalities before the
reform which may be correlated with both Debt and Freeride; which would bias the
estimated e⁄ect in equation (7). Thanks to the way in which the amalgamation reform
was implemented, a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DID) approach van be used. Before 1969,
amalgamations were only voluntary but they became mandatory in 1969. This suggests
that one can take the di⁄erence between the year before the amalgamation came into e⁄ect
(i.e., either in 1970 or 1973) as the ￿nal year and the year before the law was imposed (i.e.
1968) as the pre-treatment year to test the free riding e⁄ect. If the treatment Freeride
was a binary indicator, i.e. 1 for the municipalities amalgamating and 0 for those not
amalgamating, the ￿ can be characterized as follows, where upper bars denote means:
Figure 1
DID - Binary Treatment























20It is convenient to formulate the relationship as positive, since we can then refer to an increase in the
coe¢ ent instead of an increase in the magnitude or an increase in absolute value.
8However, since our model gives at hand that Freeride is continuos, equation (7)
becomes
￿DEBT it = ￿ + ￿￿Freerideit + vit; (8)
where ￿ is the di⁄erence operator; either the di⁄erence between 1970 and 1968, or be-
tween 1973 and 1968 depending on whether a municipality amalgamated in 1970/71 or
1973/74. Since the reform only a⁄ected the municipalities after 1969 but not before1969,
￿Freeride = Freeride: Thus, one can be estimated (8) as
￿DEBT it = ￿ + ￿Freerideit + vit: (9)
We can also include pre-reform characteristics as control variables in (9). These char-
acteristics can be used for testing whether the variable of interest, i.e., Freeride, is ￿as
good as randomly assigned". Thus, these controls should not a⁄ect the estimated free
riding e⁄ect unless the reform is correlated with the error term. Adding controls are also
motivated from an e¢ ciency point of view. An implicit assumption of the di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence approach is that the municipalities that were a⁄ected by the amalgamations
should have had similar trends in the level of debt before 1968 as those municipalities
that were not a⁄ected. As a matter of fact, below I present evidence suggesting that they
do have similar trends in the level of debt before 1968.
The data set consists of all Swedish municipalities from 1962-1974 and is constructed
from o¢ cial statistics provided by Statistics Sweden. I have collected data based on the
report of 1962. The data is an unbalanced panel where a municipality that amalgamates
merges into the new municipality in the next year.21 Furthermore, in the main analysis,
the new amalgams of 1971 are dropped, since the behavior after the amalgamation might
be a⁄ected by previous opportunistic behavior by the amalgamating partners. For a more
detailed description of sources and de￿nitions, see Appendix.
Table I shows a summary of important variables for the 848 municipalities that ex-
isted in 1969. Except for the variable of interest, Freeride; and the dependent variable,
￿DEBT, I report 1962 year values for the variables mentioned by the committee. The
variables reported are potential controls for testing whether Freeride is "as good as ran-
domly assigned". Since we know which variables were important for the amalgamation
reform from the proposal of 1962, we have very good candidates for that test.22 All nom-
inal values are de￿ ated to 1962 SEK by using the CPI. The theoretical model does not
make a distinction between change in long-term debt or short-term debt. It is likely that
long-term debt captures most of the free riding behavior, since it can be used to provide
local goods such as sports stadiums and alike. These types of investments provide utility
to the old municipality in the future. Given the restriction that long-term debt could not
21It sometimes happens that small parts (i.e. some parishes) of a municipality amalgamate into a
di⁄erent unit than the major part of the municpality. Since I have no data at the parish level, I classify
an amalgamating municipality according to its major part.
22For municipalities created in the period 1963-1968, I report the initial values.
9be used for consumption, spending could mainly be ￿nanced through taxes or short-term
debt. If the free riding motive is at work, a municipality should prefer short-term debt
to taxes. However, short-term debt must be honored regularly, which should mitigate the
free-riding e⁄ect. Yet, we can expect a municipality to roll over short-term debt in the
very last year before the amalgamation. Lastly, short-term debt could be hard to exploit
for a municipality if private companies are credit constrained. For simplicity, I will con-
centrate on the sum of short- and long-term debt, but I will also explore this potential
di⁄erence in the subsequent analysis section
Taking a closer look at Table I, I have divided the outcome variable ￿DEBT into
two sub groups. ￿DEBT 70￿68 is the change of per capita debt for the municipalities
amalgamating 1970/71 and ￿DEBT 73￿68 is the change of per capita debt for the mu-
nicipalities that amalgamate in 1973/74 or are not subject to amalgamation. We see a
clear di⁄erence for these variables between the groups. The municipalities amalgamating
already after two years, 1970/71, only accumulates 132 SEK on average, but where the
other groups consisting of those amalgamating in 1973/74 or not amalgamating at all,
accumulate approximately 250 % more in debt.
Furthermore, we can conclude that there is substantial variation in the incentive to
free ride. Freeride has an average of around 0.66 but a standard deviation of 0.32. As
previously discussed, the proposal of 1962 aimed at creating larger municipalities centered
around economic geographic nodes, where the node is understood as a place with a high
population density. Thus, a population density measure is needed. Table I reports the
percentages living in central locations (cities or small towns), denoted Population density.
Yet, the most important factor for the committee was population size and the average
municipality in Sweden had about 9086 inhabitants in 1962. The huge standard deviation
indicates that the larger cities are substantially larger than a normal sized municipality.
Furthermore, the committee argued that the new municipalities should be more dispersed
with regard to occupational character. I include two measures for occupational character:
share of the working population in the agricultural sector and alike; and share of the
working population in the manufacturing sector and alike. Regarding taxes, the tax base,
the tax base per capita as well as the tax rate are presented, where the tax base is





￿DEBT 70￿68 525 132.149 334.697
￿DEBT 73￿68 323 213.914 941.590
Freeride 848 .661 .321
Population density 848 .467 .299
Population 848 9086 34233
Share in agricultural sector 848 .286 .203
Share in manufacturing sector 848 .327 .198
Tax rate 848 9.890 1.762
Tax base 848 477406 2594048
Tax base per capita 848 37.239 11.963
5 Results
This section ￿rst presents graphical evidence. Second, regression results based on (9) are
provided. The main reason for the graphical analysis, except for investigating a potential
e⁄ect, is to provide evidence for parallel trends before the reform. With the regression
analysis, we make systematic tests, but also check if Freeride is "as good as randomly
assigned".
5.1 Graphical Evidence
One simple way of illustrating the potential e⁄ect of a reform when using the di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence approach is to plot the level of the variable of interest over time for di⁄erent
treatment groups. Figure II shows the level of per capita debt over the years 1962 to 1973
for those who never amalgamate (NA) and the municipalities amalgamating at some time
within the period (A) and corresponds to the binary treatment case as shown in Figure
I. Clearly, NA starts out with a higher per capita debt than the A (997 vs. 609 SEK).
Yet, the trends look rather similar until 1969, when the law that forced municipalities
to amalgamate was passed. The change in the trend in 1969 indicates an e⁄ect of the
law of about the size of 200 SEK. In relation to the average level of debt in 1968, this
is approximately 17 %. However, the free riding e⁄ect is not precisely measured by this
crude division. We know from the model that municipalities that amalgamate should
have di⁄erent incentives to free ride.
11Figure II
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More precisely, the model predicts a monotone positive relationship between the in-
centive to free ride and the change of debt, not just an e⁄ect of the reform as such. This
is to say that the debt policy of a municipality with very weak incentives to free ride
should be more similar to the policy of a municipality that is not amalgamating than
to the policy of a municipality with strong incentives to free ride, everything else equal.
Thus, I argue that in order to believe that the common pool problem is the underlying
mechanism explaining the increase in debt, we should ￿nd a monotone positive relation-
ship between the incentive to free ride and the change of debt. Let us use the structure
that our economic model gives at hand and divide the sample into thirds with respect
to the incentive to free ride. "Weak" denotes the municipalities with weak incentives to
free ride by Freeride 2 [0:0;0:33];"Moderate" are the muncipalities having Freeride 2
(0:33;0:66] and "Strong" those having Freeride 2 (0:66;1):23 In the subsequent regres-
sion analysis, the full continuum of Freeride is, of course, imposed in line with the model
but for illustrative reasons the graphical exposition divides the municipalities into thirds.
Figure III shows clear evidence in favor of the prediction of the model. The munici-
palities with a strong incentive to free ride in fact on average acquire 200 SEK more debt
than those with a weak incentive. Evaluated as the share of the average level of per capita
debt for all municipalities in 1968, i.e. the year before the law, it is approximately 17 %.
23Those municipalities that are amalgams, i.e. newly created in 1971, are dropped. However, the
￿gures are similar when these are included.
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It is of further interest to divide the municipalities on the basis of the amalgamation
year. In ￿gure IV, the municipalities are ordered by amalgamation year, 1970/71 and
1973/74, respectively. The hypothesis is that the longer a period a municipality can free
ride, the larger is the e⁄ect. Moreover, it is reasonable to think that the municipalities
amalgamating in 1973/74 are the most reluctant to the amalgamation, which might in-
￿ uence the magnitude of the free riding e⁄ect. Moreover, since investments take some
time to plan and since long-term debt must be approved, we expect a smaller e⁄ect of the
municipalities that amalgamate already in 1970/71.
Figure III shows the expected pattern for both groups.24 The group amalgamating
in 1970/71 and has strong incentives to free ride, acquire approximately 100 SEK or
300 % more in debt on average than the municipalities with a weak incentive to free
ride. In relation to the average level of debt in 1968, before the law was passed, this is
approximately 9%. The municipalities with strong incentives to free ride that amalgamate
in 1973/74, acquire approximately 350 SEK more per capita debt than the municipalities
with weak incentives. In relation to the average level of debt in 1968, this is approximately
30%.
The fact that the change in debt is larger for the municpalities amalgamating in
1973/74 is reasonable as argued above. An average municipality with a strong incen-
tive, which amalgamates in 1973/74, acquires approximately 100 % more debt than a
municipality with a strong incentive but that is amalgamating in 1970/71.25
24The picture is not driven by outliers. Removing them does not change the relation.
25Note that the increase in debt for the group amalgamating in 1973/74, which have weak incetives, is
lower than for the group with weak incetives amalgamating in 1970/71. However, this is driven by the
fact that the group with weak incentives that is amalgamting later consists of all the muncipalities with
13Figure IV
￿DEBT. Sorted by Incentive to Free Ride & Amalgamation Year



























































Another question is whether the relation between the incentive to free ride and the
debt policy is spurious. One way of investigating this is to calculate the change in debt
for some period before the reform. I have done this for various periods, but in general no
monotone relationship appears. This gives further graphical support for parallel trends
before the reform when dividing the groups based on the incentive to free ride. Figure IV
shows one example for change in debt between 1962-1968.
Figure IV
￿DEBT 68￿62. Sorted by Incentive to Free Ride & Amalgamation Year










































































The graphical analysis shows there to be a strong positive relationship between the
incentive to free ride and change of debt in line with the model. Moreover, it is reassuring
no incentives to free ride, whereas the group with weak incetives in the group amalagamating in 1970/71
has none of those. Removing those municipalities with no incentive to free ride, the level is higher for
those amalgamating later.
14that graphically, we ￿nd evidence of parallel trends. Lastly, the e⁄ect is potentially eco-
nomically large. The next subsection further investigates the e⁄ects by regression analysis.
5.2 Regression Results
In this subsection, I will use (9) as the baseline speci￿cation. To recapitulate, I use OLS
on:
￿DEBT it = ￿ + ￿Freerideit + X￿ + vit: (10)
where ￿DEBTj is de￿ned as before, X contains the pre-reform characteristics poten-
tially related to the reform as discussed previously, county-speci￿c e⁄ects and intercept.26
Our model predicts that there should be no di⁄erence in the incentive to free ride between
a municipality that is amalgamating and is extremely large, relative to the amalgam, and
a municipality that is not subject to amalgamation. Thus, we include all 848 observations
in our main analysis. The results are presented in Table II.
In the ￿rst speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient of the incentive to free ride without any controls
shows the expected sign and is highly signi￿cant with the point estimate of 298. Thus,
a municipality with very strong incentives to free ride acquires 298 SEK more per capita
debt than a municipality with no incentive to free ride. In relation to the average level
of debt in 1968, this is approximately 26 %. In 2006 year values, this is about 2850 SEK
or 400 USD . Since the average of Freeride is 0.661, the e⁄ect evaluated at the mean is
approximately 197 SEK, which is roughly 17 % of the level of debt in 1968.
Including all variables related to the reform in the second speci￿cation does not change
the interpretation qualitatively and very little quantitatively. This suggests that the
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach is su¢ cient. If we had seen a large discrepancy between
speci￿cations 1 and 2, we would doubt that the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator was
appropriate. Formally, an F-test testing if all the coe¢ cients are equal to zero cannot be
rejected at any reasonable signi￿cance level.27 The e⁄ect is of the magnitude of 249 SEK,
which is approximately 21 % of the average level of debt in 1968. Evaluated at the mean
of the incentive to free ride, the e⁄ect is around 164 SEK, which is approximately 14 %
of the level of debt in 1968.
There are some plausible reasons why the e⁄ect of the incentive to free ride might di⁄er
between the groups that are amalgamating. First, time in treatment might be important.
For example, municipalities might have di¢ culties in borrowing as much as preferred
in one year since the municipality could be credit constrained. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1969 and the municipalities that amalgamate had already passed their budget
for that year. Hence, these municipalities in fact only had one year for acquiring debt,
26County e⁄ects are introduced since a municipality must be a consistent area, which means that most
amalgamations took place within the same county.
27The F-statistics takes the value 0.52 with the corresponding p-value of 0.821
15if they did not foresee the law. Thus, a longer time period in treatment might increase
the e⁄ect. Moreover, it might be the case that the groups di⁄er in some dimension not
controlled for by the control variables.28 Speci￿cation 3 shows the result from including
an interaction of Freeride with a dummy, 70; where 70 takes the value of one for those
amalgamating in 1970=71: All controls are also interacted. For brevity, I suppress the
estimates of the controls. If the arguments above are true, we would then expect that
including Freeride￿70 should increase the point estimate of Freeride and give a negative
estimate for Freeride ￿ 70: In fact, the point estimate of Freeride increases to 455 SEK
and the point estimate of Freeride ￿ D70 is negative of the size ￿355 SEK. Thus, a
municipality with a very strong incentive to free ride that is amalgamating in 1973=74
acquires 455 SEK more debt than a municipality with no incentives to free ride. For the
group amalgamating in 1970, the point estimate is only of the size 455￿355 = 100 SEK.
Given the set up of the reform, I cannot distinguish between the proposed mechanisms
that makes the free riding e⁄ect smaller for muncipalities amalgamating earlier, but we
can conclude that there is clear evidence of a signi￿cantly lower e⁄ect although that the
positive relation remains.
As previously discussed, we could potentially expect a larger e⁄ect on long-term debt
than on short-term debt. In speci￿cations 4 and 5 in Table II, the results are shown from
using the change in short- and long-term debt as dependent variables.29 The incentive to
free ride does not determine the change of short-term debt at any reasonable signi￿cance
levels. Moreover, the point estimate is small, however with the expected sign. However,
using long-term debt as the dependent variable, we get closer to the previous estimates,
both with regard to the signi￿cance level and the size of the point estimate. Thus, most
of the e⁄ect goes through acquiring long-term debt.
Our model assumes that the increase in debt is used to provide some type of local
public good. As previously argued, it seems most likely that a municipality about to
amalgamate would like to bias its use of debt to long-term investments in order to enjoy
utility for some future period. Moreover, since we know that long-term debt cannot be
used for consumption, it is reasonable that using a measure for long-term investments
should yield similar results. Instead of using ￿DEBTj; a good candidate would be the
change in long-term assets. The reason for not only using long term-assets as the main
dependent variable in the analysis instead of the change in debt is two-fold. First, there
are other ways of directing resources to the municipality than through acquiring long-term
assets. Second, the way long-term assets are reported is more arbitrary since it is not
priced at the market and the borderline between short- and long-term assets is sometimes
non-trivial.30 This means that we can expect measurement error in this variable and larger
28One argument would be that those amalgamating earlier are those that can co-operate at the lowest
cost and/or are able to build trust, which might mitigate the free-riding e⁄ect.
29There is missing data on the long- and short-term debt for four municipalities. Only the aggregate
is reported. These municipalities are excluded.
30A linear regression of Change in debt on Change in long-term assets yields a positive and signi￿cant
16standard errors. However, it is reasonable that the point estimate should be positive. The
last speci￿cation uses change in long-term assets as the dependent variable where we use
the same de￿nition, i.e. the change from the level of 1968 up to the year of amalgamation.
Clearly, the point estimate of Freeride has the expected sign, but with larger standard
errors.31
Table II














































































County e⁄ects yes yes yes yes yes
N 848 848 848 844 844 845
R2 0.022 0.098 0.142 0.089 0.115 0.078
1Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** Signi￿cant at the 1% level,**at the 5% level,*at the 10% level
2Suppressed for brevity. The controls have also been interacted with the dummy 70
The results from the regression analysis correspond to the results from graphical analy-
sis. The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach seems to be reasonable as the estimates are not
substantially altered by adding the variables that in￿ uenced the amalgamation reform.
Lastly, the e⁄ects of free riding are found to be large and signi￿cant. The next section,
coe¢ cient of 0.26. R2 is about 0.12.
31We lose three observations due to missing data.
17however, deals further with the interpretation of the e⁄ects and the robustness of the
results.
6 Robustness
Robustness checks are carried out in this section. First, we consider potential caveats
with the reform. We have previously not made any distinction among the municipalities
that were not a⁄ected by the law. However, this group consists of two types of municipal-
ities, namely those originally never chosen to amalgamate and those 35 that voluntarily
completed the amalgamation before 1969. I de￿ne the ￿rst group as "NA" in accordance
with Figure I and the latter is de￿ned as "Completed". Thus, it could be argued that the
"completed" municipalities have selected themselves into non-treatment and if this group
is non-random with respect to debt policy, this could drive the results. Consequently, I
will run regressions on a restricted sample, excluding these. Moreover, Table III presents
regression results when we restrict the sample to the municipalities that are amalgamating
only, i.e. excluding both "Completed" and "NA". Last, not all amalgamations that took
place in the voluntary period ended in a complete municipality, i.e. included some, but
not all, amalgamating partners. Thus, we would also like to run a regression with only
the municipalities that were totally una⁄ected by voluntary amalgamations, i.e. were
geographically intact within the period of 1962-1969.
In speci￿cation 1, excluding voluntary completed municipalities, we see a drop in the
estimate of Freeride: However, the e⁄ect remains positive, large and signi￿cant. Speci￿-
cation 2 further restricts the sample and only looks at the municipalities experiencing a
change in the incentive to free ride. The estimates of the incentive to free ride are of the
same magnitude baseline speci￿cation and the e⁄ect is still highly signi￿cant. In speci￿ca-
tion 3, we restrict the sample to the municipalities that were geographically intact within
the period of 1962-1969. We lose some more observations, but the point estimates are in
a similar range as the baseline speci￿cation and highly signi￿cant. Speci￿cation 4 further
restricts the sample, and excludes the group "NA". Thus, we use the muncipalities that
were geographically intact and did amalgamate the period where the law applies. The




























































































County e⁄. yes yes yes yes yes
N 813 771 736 694 694
R2 0.085 0.095 0.083 0.0890 0.110
1Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** Signi￿cant at the 1% level,**at the 5% level,*at the 10% level
Moreover, setting the pre-treatment period to 1968 might be incorrect. The law was
passed with a very slight majority, and with about a half of the municipalities protesting,
but since expectations cannot be observed, we do not know how far back the law was
anticipated.32 Evidence on anticipation could be investigated by postulating a model
that takes the 1968 level as the ￿nal level of debt and see how much of the di⁄erential
DEBT 68 ￿ DEBT 62 can be explained by Freeride. Naturally, we vary the di⁄erential
to be DEBT 68 ￿DEBT 63 or DEBT 68 ￿RCAPDEBT 64 etc. I ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect
of Freeride on these di⁄erent types of measures when including the controls. Thus, it
is reasonable that the law that forced municipalities to amalgamate did not a⁄ect debt
policy before it was passed. Furthermore, it gives evidence that Freeride is not spuriously
related to our dependent variable.
De￿ning 1968 as the pre-treatment year might lead us to draw the wrong conclusions
if the parallel trend assumption is violated. For example, if municipalities with a strong
32See, for example, Gustafsson (1984).
19incentive to free ride for some reason have a cyclical debt policy, the pre-treatment year
might be crucial for our conclusions. The estimated e⁄ect is then not a causal e⁄ect of the
reform. Prolonging the treatment period is thus a robustness test, in the sense that we
investigate how sensitive the analysis is to the choice of pre-treatment year. Speci￿cation
5 in Table III shows the results of using level of Debtama lgamation year- level of Debt62 as
dependent variable for those amalgamating in the period where the law applies. The point
estimate is signi￿cant at the 5% level and is in a similar range.33 The results are also
robust when including number of amalgamating partners.34
Furthermore, I have performed robustness checks with regard to di⁄erent functional
forms of the di⁄erent controls. The free riding e⁄ect remains signi￿cant at the 1 % level but
drops somewhat.35 I have considered the annual change of debt and used di⁄erent panel
estimators such as the ￿xed and random e⁄ects with consistent results. Furthermore, I
have removed some outliers such as large cities and also those municipalities that have
combined the decision body of the municipality with the county council.36 In general, the
point estimate remains large, positive and highly signi￿cant.
Lastly, I have done arbitrary checks on competing models that might be the correct
underlying process generating data. Alternative models are models related to free riding
on the electorate within a locality such as Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Persson and
Svensson (1989). Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) shows that the ￿rst model is not consistent
with Swedish municipal behavior in the period after the amalgamation. Moreover, I ￿nd
no indirect evidence in line with Persson and Svensson (1989) when allowing the left wing
and the right wing to respond di⁄erently.37
7 Conclusion
In the twentieth century, there was a trend towards larger local governments through
amalgamations in the western world. Amalgamations provide potential economic bene￿ts
but might also give rise to costs driven by opportunistic political behavior. This paper
33Note that we lose the municipalities that did not exist in 1962. Including the 42 municipalities that
were not a⁄ected by the law decreases the esimate to 213, but it is still signi￿cant at the 6 % level.
34One could think that fewer amalgamating partners could in￿ uence the results, holding the incentive
to free ride constant, since it might be easier to impose social pressure if the localities were few. However,
there is no such evidence.
35I have tried with both quadratic and qubic forms of all controls.
36The following municipalities had combined decision bodies: Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malm￿, Hels-
ingborg and G￿vle in 1962; Stockholm and Gothenburg in 1963-66; Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malm￿
in 1967-70; Gothenburg, Malm￿ and Gotland in 1971-74.
37I can also directly test for competing theories under the assumption that the reform a⁄ects the
incentives di⁄erently. When trying di⁄erent reasonable measures for the re-election probability, I ￿nd no
e⁄ects in line with Persson and Svensson (1989) or Tabellini and Alesina (1990). Under the assumption
that the total size of the population is related to future scale e⁄ects, I can also test if the e⁄ects are
capturing smoothing behavior. However, there is no such evidence.
20argues that the extensive amalgamation reform of 1969, which forced a vast majority
of Swedish municipalities to amalgamate, gave rise to the same free riding incentives
as in a basic common pool model. I use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach to evaluate
the e⁄ect. Since the reform was based on social geography methods, we can also check
for randomization within the framework. The free riding e⁄ect is signi￿cant and large.
Evaluated at the extreme values of the incentive to free ride, the e⁄ect is of the magnitude
of 298 SEK, which is approximately 26 % of the average level of debt in 1968. Evaluated at
the mean of the incentive to free ride, the e⁄ect is around 197 SEK, which is approximately
17 % of the level of debt in 1968. The municipalities that did amalgamate earlier also free
ride less, which is consistent with the notion that the time in treatment is of importance.
In line with the theory, we expect a municipality to invest in large projects such as sports
stadiums and alike in order to enjoy utility for a long future period, which is con￿rmed
by the study. Moreover, the results are robust and survive numerous speci￿cations and
di⁄erent types of estimators. Municipality representatives thus seem to care about their
region and behave opportunistically in the geographical sense as predicted by theory. This
paper shows that when the geographical identity and the common pool of future taxes are
clearly de￿ned and when the timing and decision procedure is close to the basic common
pool model, politicians behave in line with it.
The policy conclusion from this is rather evident and is connected to future research.
If larger municipalities are more e¢ cient and can enjoy scale economics, the free riding
incentives before an amalgamation can o⁄set some of the potential gains. Having one large
stadium in a municipality might be e¢ cient if there are scale e⁄ects, but not two medium
sized ones. Thus, voluntary amalgamations or more constrained amalgamations seem to
be the most e¢ cient way, given the goal of large e¢ cient local governments. Hence, one of
the reasons why previous research shows little evidence of e¢ ciency after amalgamations
might be that the new localities are su⁄ering from sub optimal investments before the
amalgamation, which is a natural next step for future research. If larger municipalities
are not more e¢ cient, the opportunistic behavior before an amalgamation adds an extra
cost to the cost-and-bene￿t analysis of amalgamations.
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238 Appendix: Statistical Sources and De￿nition of
Variables
The data is collected from the sources: Kommunernas Finanser (1962-1974) and ¯rsbok
f￿r Sveriges Kommuner (1962-1974), Statistics Sweden, Stockholm. Information on debt
and long-term assets is collected from Kommunernas Finanser 1962-1974. Population,
population density, share working in the agricultural and the manufacturing sector and
alike, tax rate and tax base are collected from ¯rsbok f￿r Sveriges Kommuner 1962-
1974. Furthermore, Ivarsson (1992) has been useful for determining with what other
municipality a municipality is amalgamating with, All nominal terms are de￿ ated by CPI
with 1962 as the base year.
Freeride is de￿ned as 1￿ Nj
N , where Nj is the population size in j and N is the size of
the amalgam.38
Change of debt68￿70=71 is the per capita debt level of 1970/71, minus the debt level of
1968
Change of debt68￿73=74 is the per capita debt level of 1973/74, minus the debt level of
1968
Change of debt is the level of per capita debt in 1973/74 or 1970/71, minus the debt
level of 1968.
Population density is the population density. The population density is a measure of
the share living in a densely populate area (t￿tort). It is a dichotomous variable divided
into 8 groups, where the ￿rst group A means no population in a densely populate area.
B means 0.1- 9.9 % living in a densely populate area and so forth up to the last group H,
where all live in a central location. The averages of the intervals of the groups are used.
The variable is calculated from census in 1960 and 1965. I use the values from 1960 for
those municipalities existing in 1962.
Tax rate is the tax rate on income from work that the municipality fully decides upon
(borgerlig skatt).
Tax base is the tax base which is the sum of the income that is taxable in the munic-
ipality.
Tax base per capita is the tax base per capita, which is the tax base divided by
population
38Sometimes one or some parishes in a municipality do amalgamate into a unit that is di⁄erent than
the unit where the largest part amalgamates. Since there is limited data at the parish level, I ignore this
and classify the amalgamation partners considering the largest parts of the former municipalities.
24Population is the population in a municipality.
Share in agricultural sector is the share of the working force that worked in the agri-
cultural sector and alike at the time of the census 1960.
Share in manufacturing sector is the share of the working force that worked in the
manufacturing sector and alike at the time of the census 1960.
Change in long-term assets is the change in long-term assets, de￿ned in analog with
the change of debt .
25